Introduction
Dozens of articles and monographs have been written about a potential conflict between the German Federal Constitutional Court (hereinafter FCC) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which has so far been limited to shadow-boxing. Karlsruhe relied upon dissuasive tactics and was quite successful. Its warnings encouraged the CJEU to develop reliable human rights standards, restrained an expansive reading of Union competences and fostered judicial respect for national constitutional singularities. 1 Recently, however, power games escalated when the FCC fired a forceful warning shot towards Luxembourg and pronounced that the latter's Åkerberg Fransson ruling might have been ultra vires. It will be argued that, this hand-wringing about the precise delimitation of the Background, trigger, contents and context of the FCC's reaction to the Åkerberg Fransson judgment
The experience of federal states demonstrates that human rights provide a crucial mechanism for regulating the vertical balance of power.
2 Indeed, the German example itself provides ample evidence that federal courts may activate human rights enshrined in the federal constitution, the Grundgesetz, to exercise scrutiny of autonomous regional powers. Human rights in the constitutions of Germany's regions, the Länder, never gained much prominence; nor did their constitutional courts. 3 This background explains why German academics and politicians have always been anxious about the scope of the newly drafter of Charter of Fundamental Rights. 4 For that reason, German participants, among others, advised careful drafting and, for the same reason, the FCC has now opted for a fierce and resolute response when the Åkerberg Fransson judgment signalled that the ECJ supported a generous approach.
Background: limiting the scope of the Charter
Before the Charter became legally binding, the ECJ had described the scope of EU human rights in open-ended formulations, as unwritten general principles.
These provisions reflect a general desire to uphold breathing space for national autonomy and go back to lively debates in the Convention drafting the Charter, where delegates from different member states had criticised earlier drafts, to which the Convention Presidium responded with revised, and purportedly more restrictive, language.
11 Yet, the drafting history was not conclusive. The final compromise 5 ECJ, Case C-260/89, ERT [1991] ECR I-2925, para. 42 (French: 'dans le cadre du droit communautaire'; German: 'Anwendungsbereich'). 6 ECJ, Case 5/88, Wachauf [1989] ECR 2609, para. 19 (French: 'lorsqu' ils mettent en oeuvre'; German: 'Durchführung'). 7 See the early contribution by M. Ruffert, 'Die Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaft als Verpflichtete der Gemeinschaftsgrundrechte', 22 Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift (1995) p. 518-530. 8 In line with uniform exam requirements, all German law students usually attend a 4 hour lecture on national human rights in their first year of studies which also features prominently in the centralised final state exams, while both the ECHR and the Charter play a marginal role at best and are often not taught at all. 9 See S. Iglesias Sánchez, 'The Court and the Charter', 49 CML Rev. (2012) p. 1565 at p. 1576-1582. 10 The FCC relies, among others, on these provisions to contest the ECJ's findings; see text to n. 50 infra. 12 also considering that the official Explanations indicate a continuation of earlier case-law, 13 with which other language versions are more in line than the German translation.
14 Despite these uncertainties, one lesson appeared evident: the EU was meant not to follow the example of the US and Germany, where federal courts activated federal human rights to extend their reach to the detriment of regional autonomy.
Trigger: the ECJ's Åkerberg Fransson judgment
When Luxembourg proclaimed the Åkerberg Fransson judgment, the title of the press release promised that the Court would 'explain' the field of application of the Charter. 15 Indeed, the judgment has apparently been designed as a decision of principle (even if the FCC now claims the opposite). 16 The ECJ describes the scope of the Charter in general terms and opts for continuity. In line with earlier case-law, the Charter is considered to apply 'within the scope of European Union law.' 17 The Grand Chamber explains its position with a comparison ex negativo: the orientation at the scope of Union law implied that 'situations cannot exist which are covered in that way by European Union law without those fundamental rights being applicable.' 18 This formula is as simple as it is generous. The applicability of Union law entails the application of the Charter.
The facts of the Åkerberg Fransson case illustrate the relevance of these findings. Both the Commission, the Advocate-General and various national governments had rejected the applicability of the Charter to the criminal proceedings against Åkerberg Fransson 19 given the high level of abstraction of common rules for value added tax, which did not present, including in the eyes of the Court, the criminal 12 proceedings as an implementation of the VAT Directive. 20 Instead, the facts came within the scope of Union law and, as a result, of the Charter, since member states are, generally, obliged to provide for effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions. 21 The Court's additional reference to the protection of the Union's financial interests does not render the linkage with Union law much more specific. 22 Both obligations are of a general nature, i.e. member states retain (very) wide discretion how to fight tax evasion within the framework of national procedural autonomy. Nevertheless, the ECJ assumes that the Charter applies. It would have been difficult to design a more perfect test case to demonstrate how wide the Court's new formula may stretch.
For our purposes, it should be noted that the Court opts for continuity and assumes that member states are bound by the Charter whenever they act within the 'scope of Union law' -irrespective of whether national action represents a direct implementation of Union law. 23 As a result, earlier proposals not to apply the Charter whenever member states rely on derogations from the fundamental freedoms 24 or whenever they have implementing discretion 25 are obsolete. Luxembourg will have to refine its generic formula in follow-up decisions. 26 As a matter of principle, however, the ECJ has taken a firm and confident position: the scope of EU law entails the application of the Charter.
Reaction: the FCC's counter-terrorism database Judgment
It took eight weeks for the German Constitutional Court to react to the Åkerberg Fransson ruling. The facts are not directly related to Union law and concern, in essence, a federal law which established a national Counter-Terrorism Database, 20 26 See the last section of this contribution. EuConst 9 (2013) to which regional and federal police authorities as well as intelligence services would have access. 27 A citizen had challenged the compatibility of the law with national fundamental rights -a complaint which the FCC upheld in some respects, thereby specifying further its case-law on data protection in an age of enhanced data processing capabilities. 28 Yet these issues need not be discussed any further in this contribution, since EU law enters the picture as a preliminary observation only, when the FCC considers the hypothetical option whether it should have referred the matter to Luxembourg.
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To be sure, there are no EU rules which oblige Germany to set up a central Counter-Terrorism Database, but there are, nonetheless, certain common standards, such as the Data Protection Directive or measures on police and judicial co-operation to enhance the transnational fight against terrorism, which might have indirect bearing on the law under dispute. 30 In the light of the open formula used by the ECJ in Åkerberg Fransson, these common rules might, possibly, bring the German law within the scope of Union law and, as a result, submit it to the Charter. Yet the FCC brushes aside the idea with a number of generic comments which are clearly meant to be perceived as a forceful warning shot: isolated rules on the fight against terrorism or data protection do not result in an application of the Charter, since national rules establishing the Counter-Terrorism Database 'are not determined by Union law' and do not, therefore, present an 'implementation of European Union law, which alone is capable of obliging Member States to apply the Charter (Art. 51(1)).'
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For our purposes, we should distinguish the FCC's conclusion on the CounterTerrorism Database from more general comments on Åkerberg Fransson. While the former are largely uncontroversial, the latter require our attention. Why? It may well be correct that the Data Protection Directive and common rules on the fight against terrorism do not bring the German Counter-Terrorism Database within the scope of Union law; and it might even be acceptable that this conclusion is 'so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question raised is to be resolved' 32 that it releases the FCC from the 27 34 These generic statements are relevant irrespective of whether we share the conclusion on the facts under discussion.
When it comes to its assessment of the Åkerberg Fransson judgment, the First Senate of the German Constitutional Court leaves no doubt that it was not amused. The FCC makes crystal clear that it objects to any interpretation or application of Åkerberg Fransson which 'would address the human rights laid down in the Charter to Member States in situations of an open-ended linkage between national rules and the scope of Union law with the latter being defined in an abstract manner.' 35 Remarkably, the conclusion that the Counter-Terrorism Database is not subject to EU human rights standards is explicitly based on a 'constructive' reading of the Åkerberg Fransson judgment, since the latter must be interpreted 'in a spirit of mutual coexistence between the FCC and the ECJ' and may, therefore, 'not be understood in a way which would have to be qualified as an obvious ultra vires act or which might impede the protection or accomplishment of national human rights with the result of calling into question the identity of the constitutional order established by the Grundgesetz.' 36 This is tough language and in the press release (not, however, in the judgment itself ), the German judges effectively instruct the ECJ how to retreat in an orderly way: 'The Senate acts on the assumption that the statements in the ECJ's decision are based on the distinctive features of the law on value added tax, and express no general view. 39 The explicit notification, in the press release, that the first Senate's position on Åkerberg Fransson was unanimous is apparently meant to emphasise that the ECJ should take the warning seriously. Otherwise, Karlsruhe may, for the first time ever, declare a ECJ ruling ultra vires and/or in conflict with national constitutional identity.
Doctrinal context: constitutional control standards
This is not the first time that human rights trigger a conflict between the FCC and the CJEU. In the well-known Solange saga, judges in Luxembourg went some length to 'discover' human rights as unwritten general principles in order to fend off challenges to the primacy of Union law by the German Bundesverfassungsgericht. 40 It is worth remembering that the FCC had insisted, in Solange I, that the German Constitution would prevail 'as long as (solange) the process of European integration has not led to a legally binding catalogue of fundamental rights which [...] offers a level of protection resembling, though not necessarily duplicating, the fundamental rights in the Grundgesetz.'
41 Although the FCC later accepted ECJ methodology and case-law as functionally satisfying this requirement, 42 the Charter appears as the ultimate victory of the German court. Finally, the European Union obtains a catalogue of human rights upon which it had originally insisted -and the Charter was even drafted by a Convention that was presided over by a former German chief justice. Why should the FCC now object to a situation which it helped to bring about?
It is important to understand that the fight over the Charter is not a remake of the Solange argument about the (in-)adequacy of the degree of human rights protection. The FCC's threat, in the Counter-Terrorism Database judgment, is based upon alternative doctrinal benchmarks: ultra vires and constitutional identity. Ultra vires review was first developed in the Maastricht judgment and concerns the scope of EU powers; Karlsruhe famously maintains that it is the ultimate arbiter whether or not the European Union respects the principle of attributed powers. 43 In addition, the Lisbon judgment employed the constitutional identity yardstick which, in essence, defends a functioning democracy within a sovereign German state and may be directed against the transfer or exercise of European powers in sensitive policy fields; since its reach is defined by the 'eternity clause' of the German Constitution, it may also be activated in situations when the principle of conferral is respected and, as a result, ultra vires review is bound to fail. 44 In its response to Åkerberg Fransson, the FCC refers to both control standards, 45 thereby indicating that it reserves some flexibility on how to evaluate the dispute at closer inspection.
It seems to me that an ultra vires review would hardly succeed. The reason is simple. In the Honeywell decision, the FCC had sent the judicial equivalent of a peace offer to Luxembourg by laying down a number of specifications which render ultra vires complaints strenuous in practice. 46 More specifically, the FCC recognised the primary responsibility of the CJEU for European Union law on the basis of interpretative standards such as effet utile; the FCC would not simply substitute the CJEU's conclusion with its own evaluation, but refer potential disputes to Luxembourg and require ultra vires acts to be 'manifestly in violation of competences and that the impugned act is highly significant in the structure of competences between the Member States and the Union.'
47 These criteria will rarely be met and signalled that the FCC was eager to foster reliable and constructive working relations with the CJEU. 48 Arguably, the strong and almost aggressive language of the Counter-Terrorism Database judgment may be rationalised as an act of frustration. Karlsruhe may have had the impression that the olive branch, which it had held out in Honeywell, was turned down by the ECJ in Åkerberg Fransson. 49 In the light of the standards above, it will be difficult to argue that Åkerberg Fransson constitutes an ultra vires act. To be sure, the judgment is highly significant for the vertical balance of power. But the ECJ's standpoint can hardly be qualified as a 'manifest' misconception of the EU Treaties. One may object the outcome, but has to recognise, nonetheless, that the wording, drafting history and the official explanations of the Charter comprise various arguments which support the 44 49 As argued by Grimm, supra n. 34, p. 591.
conclusion that the ECJ's position presents an 'outcome in the usual legal science discussion framework.' 50 Moreover, protection clauses against an extensive interpretation of EU competences in the light of the Charter, which the FCC highlighted both in the Honeywell decision and the Counter-Terrorism Database judgment, 51 do not generally support a different outcome, since they are primarily aimed at the interpretation of legislative competences. 52 The European Union, however, may not adopt more directives or regulations as a result of Åkerberg Fransson. 53 For all these reasons, it will be difficult for the FCC to find an ultra vires act in line with the Honeywell decision.
If ultra vires review is elusive, the novel constitutional identity standard represents an attractive alternative, since the contents is ultimately defined by the German Constitution. 54 Nonetheless, the first Senate will find it difficult to support a violation, since constitutional identity protects 'the ability of a constitutional state to democratically shape itself,' 55 and has been activated, hitherto, primarily to enhance scrutiny of EU affairs by the German parliament. 56 Any argument that non-majoritarian constitutional review by courts constitutes an integral part of democratic self-government may rest on sound theoretical footing, 57 but would transcend the pro-parliamentarian thrust of earlier case-law. 58 Judges might instead consider a novel combination of ultra vires and constitutional identity. 59 In any 50 FCC, Honeywell, supra n. 43, para. 66; for a similar assessment, see Gärditz, supra n. 28, p. 636 in his footnote 31.
51 FCC, Honeywell, supra n. 43, para. 78 and FCC, Counter-Terrorism Database, supra n. 27, para. 90 refer to Art. 51(2) of the Charter and/or Art. 6(1) TEU. 52 Arguably, the reference to the EU's 'powers' and 'competences' in Art. 51(2) of the Charter and Art. 6(1)(2) TEU refers to the interpretation of the new categories of 'competences' in accordance with Art. 2-6 TFEU (although an overtly generous interpretation of Art. 51(1) may, of course, fall foul of Art. 5 TEU and be ultra vires as a result). 53 In Åkerberg Fransson, the ECJ does not extend the scope of Union law under recourse to the Charter, but argues, rather, that the Charter applies in situations which are already within the scope of Union law anyway. 54 57 Even if constitutional theory and history provide ample examples that the horizontal balance of powers is indeed often country-specific and subject to domestic bargaining; cf. M. Rosenfeld, The Identity of the Constitutional Subject (Routledge 2010). 58 Although the FCC's first Senate already indicated that it might apply constitutional identity to its own review process in FCC, Data Retention, supra n. 29, para. 218: 'It forms part of Germany's constitutional identity […] that the exercise of individual freedom by citizens may not be registered in its entirety.' 59 The FCC could, for instance, argue that stringent criteria for ultra vires review in Honeywell do not apply in situations which are closely related to Germany's constitutional identity and that, therefore, Åkerberg Fransson required stricter scrutiny.
case, there remain plenty of questions for the FCC to answer. For the time being, the first Senate got its message across, also because it abstained from lengthy scholarly deliberations mirroring the Lisbon judgment. The core point cannot be missed: Luxembourg shall retreat, otherwise Karlsruhe will take up the gauntlet.
Underlying conceptual differences
It would be one-sided to assume that the ECJ delivered the Åkerberg Fransson judgment without due regard to national sensitivities. Judges in the Grand Chamber knew that their verdict on Article 51 of the Charter had been expected nervously in Germany 60 and beyond. 61 Indeed, the Court did not ignore corresponding concerns and presented its vision of peaceful coexistence through a compromise which, in future, may provide room for country-specific solutions within the overall context of the Charter. This settlement will be called the 'fusion thesis' in this article and it will be argued later that it will satisfy expectations of many national (constitutional) courts -with the notable exception of Karlsruhe. The underlying reason is simple. Over recent years, the FCC has propagated a different solution, which I shall call the 'separation thesis' and which aims at safeguarding national autonomy by means of strict demarcation of national human rights and the Charter. Arguably, the FCC's harsh response to Åkerberg Fransson may be explained, at least in part, by the underlying difference of both approaches. Karlsruhe understands that its strategy may come to nothing, since the CJEU pursues an alternative settlement.
Compromise of the CJEU: the 'fusion thesis'
In contrast to the German FCC, the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional is willing to communicate directly with the CJEU by means of preliminary reference (and not only via press release). In the well-known Melloni case, the Spanish court asked Luxembourg whether the Spanish constitutional prohibition of trials in absentia could be directed against a transfer from Spain to Italy on the basis of an European Arrest Warrant in the light of Article 53 of the Charter, which safeguards, in general terms, the level of protection of human rights in national constitutions.
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In its judgment, delivered on the same day as Åkerberg Fransson, the ECJ accepts 60 105-127. that the provision supports country-specific solutions as a matter of principle, thereby allowing some degree of value pluralism. Yet it draws a red line: Article 53 of the Charter does not authorise national courts to set aside the primacy of EU law; when it comes to Union law, only the Charter may serve as a yardstick of validity -not national constitutions.
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The
66 Whenever member states do not have implementing discretion, human rights protection is fully supranationalised 67 -a result which the German FCC would not contest, since it has accepted, ever since Solange II, that national human rights do not apply to mandatory rules of Union law. 68 In my view, the ECJ is correct to extend these principles to Article 53 of the Charter, which shields national human rights 'in their respective fields of application', and which from the perspective of the EU legal order, had never included secondary Union law.
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Having acknowledged the limits of national deviations, we may identify the positive twist of the ECJ's approach to Article 53. It opts against full harmonisation of human rights standards in areas covered by the (broad) reach of Article 51. Within the wide scope of Union law, the Charter is not the only, quasi-totalitarian human rights benchmark, but may be complemented by national guarantees: 63 [W]here a court of a Member State is called upon to review whether fundamental rights are complied with by a national provision or measure which, in a situation where action of the member states is not entirely determined by European Union law, implements the latter for the purposes of Article 51(1) of the Charter, national authorities and courts remain free to apply national standards of protection.
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To be sure, primary and secondary Union law command primacy over national human rights in cases of conflict. But in areas, where member states have discretion, they may opt for differentiated solutions. In such scenarios, the Charter does not give rise to uniformity.
It seems to me that the recognition of national specificities in the application of the Charter is not just gesture politics, even if the immediate outcome of the Melloni judgment emphasises its centripetal thrust. Structural considerations show that the pluralist underpinning of the 'fusion thesis' will be realised. Judicial capacity does not allow Luxembourg to engage in micromanagement of human rights adjudication at the fringes of European law. The ECJ should ensure that it retains full control of validity disputes 71 and for the consistent interpretation of EU legislation in the light of Charter.
72 By contrast, it should refrain from in-depth interventions where Union law is loosely knit. The Charter will apply in such situations, but the Court should limit itself to basic principles, which will often reiterate ECtHR case-law (not much different from Åkerberg Fransson, where the ne bis in idem principle will have to be put into effect by the Swedish court 73 ). Procedurally, this outcome is supported by the dominance of preliminary references and the absence of human rights complaints by individuals in Luxembourg. Hence, the structure of the European court system will sustain an active role for national (constitutional) courts.
Another recent decision on the European Arrest Warrant demonstrates that EU minimum rules or broad discretion for national authorities leave room for national (constitutional) courts to creatively unfold country-specific solutions under the umbrella of the Charter. In response to the French Conseil constitutionnel, the ECJ confirmed that Union law tolerates enhanced human rights at national level, since rights of appeal have not been fully harmonised (in contrast to trials in absentia): 'provided that the application of the Framework Decision is not frustrated, [ 74 This is the 'fusion thesis' in action and Luxembourg should build upon this example. Doing so will protect the relative autonomy of the member states and will guarantee that the wide reach of the Charter does not result in uniformity. 75 For the purposes of our analysis, it should be emphasised that Luxembourg accepts that member states and national (constitutional) courts should have breathing space for autonomous and country-specific solutions which allow for a certain degree of value pluralism within the scope of Union law. Yet, this solution is not brought about by means of strict demarcation between spheres of influence, but realised within the broader framework of the EU Charter (and the ECHR). National deviations are blended into the application of the Charter and are combined with a broad definition of its field of application. That is the essence of the ECJ's 'fusion thesis': national singularities and the Charter are synthesised.
Vision of the FCC: the 'separation thesis'
Karlsruhe has not been sitting idle during the past decade pending the entry into force of the Charter. Rather, the FCC's first senate, whose jurisdiction focuses on human rights, developed its vision on how to preserve the relative autonomy of national legal orders. This scheme had been developed for EU human rights as unwritten general principles of Community law originally and was extended to the Charter later. I shall call the FCC's standpoint 'separation thesis', since it focuses on a strict demarcation of respective sphere of influence. One may trace this approach back to the original Solange decisions, which rested on the assumption that the application of European law by national courts either is subject to EU standards (whose suitability the FCC recognised in Solange II) or falls within the ambit of the Grundgesetz. 76 In recent years, this approach has been fine-tuned and extended to areas, such as the transposition of directives, where national and European law are often intrinsically linked.
The operation of the 'separation thesis' is illustrated best in relation to implementing discretion. In such situations, the FCC distinguishes accurately between matters which are determined by EU law and issues which are left to member states. Such discretion may concern legislative transposition by national parliaments or administrative application through state authorities. In both cases, the FCC 74 See ECJ, Case C-168/13 PPU, F [2013] ECR I-0000, para. 53 without reference, however, to either Article 53 of the Charter or the Melloni and Åkerberg Fransson decisions. 75 It should be noted that member states retain freedom to increase the level of protection only, while less human rights protection would not be covered by Art. 53 of the Charter (even if pluralist constitutional theory might suggest otherwise). 76 See FCC, Solange II, supra n. 42, p. 387; and FCC, decision of 7 June 2000, 2 BvL 1/97, Bananenmarktordnung, BVerfGE 102, 147. maintains that national constitutions apply to domestic rules within the range of member state discretion, while the Charter serves as the benchmark for those aspects which are determined by Union law. 77 Sophisticated guidelines for domestic courts are meant to put the 'separation thesis' into practice. They are obliged to assess in detail, if necessary by means of preliminary references to Luxembourg, whether and, if so, to what extent directives or regulations leave member states room for discretionary implementation. 78 Once regular courts have assessed the room for manoeuvre left to member states, Karlsruhe may decide about its own involvement: in situations of implementing discretion, individuals and lower courts may seize the FCC. By contrast, Karlsruhe is replaced by Luxembourg insofar as EU law dictates the outcome, complaints by individuals and references by lower courts are inadmissible.
79
Against the background of our previous analysis, one might object that the FCC's approach can be accommodated with the CJEU's position. Luxembourg would respect the relative autonomy of national legal orders under the umbrella of the Charter in line with the 'fusion thesis' described above. This would grant Karlsruhe some leeway, which, in practice, would function pretty much like the margin of appreciation doctrine employed by the ECtHR. Why should the FCC oppose this solution? It seems to me that structural obstacles explain its rigorous stance on the scope of the Charter in the Counter-Terrorism Database judgment. Together with theoretical cleavages to be discussed later, these structural considerations may have motivated the FCC to insist upon a narrow reading of Article 51 of the Charter. More specifically, they concern ultimate control, domestic clout and division of labour with regular courts.
Firstly, the Åkerberg Fransson and Melloni judgments made crystal clear that the ECJ retains full control over the relative autonomy of domestic human rights standards. National courts may continue to apply domestic guarantees 'provided that the level of protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, [is] not thereby compromised.' 80 Put differently, Luxembourg determines the freedom of action for national courts and has the upper hand in cases of conflict.
In the case of the ECtHR, the situation is quite different, since most national constitutional courts preserve some leeway as to whether to align themselves with Strasbourg. 81 For the reasons outlined above I am optimistic that Luxembourg will grant member states considerable leeway, especially in areas where Union law is loosely knit. As a matter of principles, however, national autonomy remains flexible by the grace of judges in Luxembourg.
Secondly, the FCC is much more than an ordinary court. Its influence over European affairs is legendary and yet judgments on European integration are only an offspring of domestic significance. The interpretation of fundamental rights in the Grundgesetz constitutes the bedrock of the FCC's domestic influence. Arguably, Karlsruhe has managed successfully to portray the Grundgesetz as a microcosm of social and political conflicts within Germany which are, then, resolved through the interpretation of human rights. 82 To accept that European law and the Court of Justice may have an important word to say on these matters would lay the axe to the root of Karlsruhe's domestic clout. 83 Imagine a situation where the Grundgesetz overlaps with the Charter -with primacy of the latter in cases of conflict. Karlsruhe would regularly have to refer questions to Luxembourg in order to manage interaction. 84 Everyone would understand that the FCC is being dethroned. 85 That is why the difference between 'fusion' and 'separation' matters. Karlsruhe defends its crown jewels.
Thirdly, there are other courts within Germany -and a wide reading of the scope of the Charter may have significant repercussions on the domestic division of labour between the FCC and ordinary courts. Why? In fields not covered by EU law, the FCC is the ultimate judicial authority and it has developed multiple doctrines and mechanisms to control legal developments at infra-constitutional level. Within the scope of Union law, however, this influence is undermined, since regular courts may bypass the FCC by referring questions to Luxembourg, whose interpretation prevails in cases of conflict. 86 Such empowerment of regular courts vis-à-vis the FCC would be particularly pronounced whenever the Charter requires balancing of different human rights. 87 As a result, leeway which the CJEU will provide for country-specific solutions in the de-centralised application of the Charter, may be seized by regular courts in Germany (not the FCC) . 88 The 'separation thesis' propagated by the FCC evades these pitfalls and tries to uphold, for the time being, the status quo ante.
Theoretical repercussions of the judicial dispute
Half a century ago, the ECJ faced a foundational choice. It had to decide whether human rights in national constitutions can be directed against EU law. The answer from Luxembourg was firm and is well-known: national human rights cannot be relied upon to challenge the validity of EU law; 89 domestic courts must give primacy to Union law in cases of conflict; 90 autonomous human rights standards, developed by the ECJ, serve as yardsticks for secondary Union law instead. 91 This story has often been told and deserves, nonetheless, a fresh look. For the purposes of our analysis, it demonstrates that the judicial assertion of distinct and separate standards at national and European level was, at the time, no German hobby horse. Quite to the contrary, Luxembourg was eager to draw a clear line between the EU legal order and national constitutions -a position of principle which Åkerberg Fransson complements with a more nuanced outlook on the relative autonomy of EU human rights.
To be sure, the Court of Justice developed EU human rights, as general principles of law, under due regard to constitutional traditions common to member states. 92 In practice, however, Luxembourg eagerly protected the autonomy and primacy of Union law, 93 and, by doing so, pursued its own variant of the 'separation thesis' quite similar to the FCC's present position. 94 Against this background, the shift of emphasis from separation to fusion shows why recent developments may epitomise much more than judicial handwringing. Arguably, they reflect a fundamental disagreement about how to accommodate value pluralism and European law. While the FCC tries to keep legal orders apart, the CJEU seems willing to consider a greater degree of mutual reflexivity. After having acknowledged systematic differences between the courts, this section presents some preliminary conclusions about theoretical repercussions for general models of the interaction of national and European law.
It is important to understand that the day-to-day management of the fusion thesis will necessitate permanent conversations across jurisdictional boundaries -both procedurally through preliminary references and substantively about the contents of human rights law. National courts cannot apply the limits for national deviations maintained by the CJEU without intimate knowledge of the Charter, since the latter prevails in cases of conflict. 95 This constant exchange of ideas will be reinforced by active engagement of both national courts and the CJEU with ECtHR case-law, which guides the interpretation of the Charter. 96 Doing so will result in occasional conflicts, but may nonetheless foster the gradual alignment of human rights standards. 97 If that happens, the 'fusion thesis' would reinforce a trend towards reflexivity and permeability with national and European courts engaging in constant dialogue about the substantive meaning of human rights and other constitutional principles across jurisdictional boundaries. Such dialogue is supported by integration clauses in national constitutions and corresponding provisions in the EU treaties, 98 which establish substantive passerelles linking national constitutional traditions with corresponding principles of Euro-pean public law. 99 In the long run, we may even observe the gradual emergence of a ius commune on human rights.
Different types of pluralism
Experts on EU law and state theory have been fascinated by the confrontation between Karlsruhe and Luxembourg for decades. It remains, to this date, a pillar of many proposals on how to rationalise the fragmented character of legal orders in Europe and countervailing claims to ultimate authority among highest courts. 100 In the field of human rights, the dispute between Germany's and the EU's top courts is complemented by judicial disagreements over the status of the European Convention in different High Contracting Parties as well as the Kadi saga about the autonomy of EU law. 101 Taken together, these skirmishes play a prominent role in pluralist accounts of law, which have emerged as a lead narrative to account for the loss of legal unity in today's world. 102 While the recent dispute confirms the appeal of pluralist thinking in general, it invites us to consider discrepancies among distinctive strands of pluralism.
From the perspective of state law, conceptual differences in pluralist thought seemed negligible. The novelty factor of the key message, the loss of legal unity, concealed differences among authors. These divergences stand out, however, once you accept the basic assumption that the unity of legal orders has been lost.
Second, there are the legal accounts which recognise the primary separation of legal orders but emphasise mutual interconnections as the basis for intra-legal solutions to conflicts through procedural and substantive reflexivity. While some proponents of this group focus on positive legal rules which may serve as passerelles between legal orders, 105 another subcategory discusses the identification of background norms regulating the interaction of legal orders, thereby constructing a meta-level, 106 which, in the field of human rights, resonates with non-positivist positions. 107 For our purposes, the first model bears a resemblance to the 'separation thesis' of the FCC, whereas the second model corresponds to the 'fusion thesis' of the CJEU described earlier. Karlsruhe makes an effort to preserve the self-sufficiency of the German Constitution and the domestic court system by insisting upon a strict demarcation of respective fields of application.
108 By contrast, the CJEU seems willing to blend national singularities into the application of the Charter, 109 thereby paving the way for a constant exchange of ideas about the contents of pan-European human rights standards across jurisdictional boundaries. 110 If that is correct, the recent dispute is about much more than scope of the Charter. It reflects basic disagreement over how to accommodate national constitutions and EU law. Do they belong to two different worlds, amongst which interchange is controlled by judicial disputes pursued by courts as interest-driven rational actors trying to extend their leverage? Or are national constitutions and EU law separate but not separable with courts engaging in a communicative dialogue about how to conceive of the foundations of legitimate public authority in an age of jurisdictional overlap which is defined by substantive reflexivity of constitutional rules and principles at national and European level? Arguably, this theoretical cleavage underlies divergent judicial positions on the scope of the Charter.
Ideal types and judicial reality
We can expect neither the (rotating) Grand Chamber of the ECJ nor the two senates of the FCC to have a uniform conceptual vision of how national autonomy should be accommodated with the Charter, let alone describe it in their judgments. We can expect judges, at best, to deliver decisions which resolve the questions at hand and establish coherent standards for the future. This does not stop academia, though, from a reconstruction of the case-law and the exploration of theoretical implications. In doing so, commentators regularly transcend original materials; academic reconstruction need not coincide with the actual motivation of judges nor does it necessarily reflect all facets of a particular case. They are ideal types in a Weberian sense which are formed upon judgments as legal phenomena and accentuate certain features for analytical purposes. This contribution is no exception. The separation and fusion theses, developed above, are idealised accentuations of the Åkerberg Fransson and the Counter-Terrorism Database rulings. Since they are analytical tools, judicial reality can be more nuanced. Luxembourg may be less integrative than the fusion thesis suggests, while Karlsruhe could be less separatist.
The position of the ECJ is particularly ambiguous, since the emphasis on national singularities in the domestic application of the Charter comes with a resolute insistence upon the primacy of Union law over national human rights in cases of conflict.
111 Moreover, the wide interpretation of Article 51 of the Charter reaffirms the ECJ's authority over disputes with a loose connection to EU law; this self-conscious claim of jurisdiction guarantees, as a side-effect, that judges in Luxembourg retain a firm grip over national disputes with an EU dimension after the forthcoming accession of the EU to the ECHR; it allows the ECJ to insist upon a similar generous handling of the prior involvement procedure which will grant Luxembourg a first say before a decision in Strasbourg. 112 Moreover, it should be emphasised that the ECJ does not extend the 'fusion thesis' to international law. Luxembourg has famously rejected any modification of EU human rights standards in the Charter in relation to UN law in both Kadi judgments. 113 To this date, reflexive fusion remains a continental phenomenon embracing national constitutions, EU law and the European Convention.
To recognise that the 'fusion thesis' coincides with interest-driven utility maximisation on the side of the CJEU does not imply that the concept will not work. I have mentioned above structural reasons which will support a generous approach of the CJEU towards national deviations. 114 Moreover, the CJEU is moving in this direction already. In a number of prominent cases, judges emphasised that member states retain room for country-specific solutions when applying EU stan- 114 See text between n. 71 and n. 73 supra; it is beyond the confines of this article to analyse whether and to what extent German constitutional law may support substantive reflexivity towards EU human rights -in contrast to FCC case-law. dards: they 'retain the freedom to determine the requirements of public policy and public security in accordance with their national needs, which can vary from one Member State to another and from one era to another.' 115 Such flexibility may be enhanced whenever certain values relate to the constitutional identity of a member state. 116 If Luxembourg builds upon these examples when it interprets the Charter, national courts may learn to appreciate the 'fusion thesis.' Overarching principles stretching across legal orders may guide the gradual alignment of national laws and Union law 117 and pave the way for Union law and national laws to 'go hand in hand in the European legal area.' 118 That may be the ultimate prize of the fusion thesis. Jurisdictional overlap gives way to substantive reflexivity with an emphasis on unity-enhancing elements of Europe's pluralist legal reality.
Pragmatic approximation of divergent positions
In Åkerberg Fransson, the ECJ opts for a clear-cut position which equates the scope of Union law with the field of application of the Charter. But what precisely defines the 'scope of Union law'? Luxembourg will have to specify this abstract formula in follow-up cases, thereby possibly limiting implications for the domestic application of the Charter. On the other hand, the FCC will have to recognise that even a narrow reading of Article 51 implies that the Charter overlaps with national constitutions to a certain extent and that, therefore, its 'separation thesis' cannot always be applied. For the purposes of our analysis, this would mean that both the ECJ and the FCC may find common ground for conciliatory gestures and peaceful coexistence, even if underlying structural and theoretical cleavages are not being resolved. I would not be surprised if such pragmatic approximation was discussed when a delegation from Luxembourg visited Karlsruhe a few weeks after Åkerberg Fransson.
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FCC: gradual adaptation to jurisdictional overlap
Prior to Åkerberg Fransson, the FCC had emphasised that it would continue to apply fundamental rights enshrined in the Grundgesetz to national measures which scope of corresponding rules ratione personae. 144 Even the Grand Chamber may have been trying to explain this difference, albeit indirectly, in Åkerberg Fransson. 145 If the wide conceptualisation of the 'scope of Union law' for the purposes of Article 18 TFEU cannot be extended to Article 51 of the Charter, it seems plausible that EU coordination of national policies and other support measures short of legislative harmonisation do not bring about an application of the Charter. 146 Legally non-binding recommendations, for instance, would not result in the domestic application of the Charter, even if member states followed the advice of EU institutions. 147 An important indication that Luxembourg may be of the same view is a recent decision rejecting a preliminary reference from a Portuguese court about the national adjustment programme within the wider framework of reinforced macroeconomic coordination in the euro-zone 148 (although the Court was wrong to present an unreasoned decision only 149 ). In a different context, the ECJ had already refused to submit the European Stability Mechanism to the Charter. 150 Positively described, both limitations described above would concentrate the application of the Charter on the fulfilment, on the side of member states, of legal obligations under EU law. 151 If that is correct, potential EU legislative competences which have not been exercised yet are not covered by Article 51 of the Charter either. 152 Consequently, the focal point for the domestic application of the Charter would be national rules covered by secondary EU legislation, in particular the discretionary transposition of directives 153 and the flexible application of regulations. 154 With regard to these two categories, however, Karlsruhe will find it extremely difficult to maintain the ultra vires threat given that the wording of Article 51 of the Charter makes use of language which closely resembles established terminology for these scenarios. 155 Within the reach of secondary law, both binding obligations and optional rules authorising national action without mandating it 156 would bring about the application of the Charter. 157 This would certainly be a generous formula embracing situations of broad national discretion; 158 but it would not be without limits.
For our purposes, the solution above respects the abstract formula put forward by the ECJ in Åkerberg Fransson and distinguishes, on its basis, situations which do (not) fall 'within the scope of Union law.' This would not reverse structural incompatibilities underlying the divergent approaches of the ECJ and the FCC, but it might provide a pragmatic basis for peaceful co-existence. It should be noted that Luxembourg behaved similarly in a similarly contentious dispute in recent years: after having extended Union citizenship to situations without crossborder effects in the controversial Ruiz Zambrano judgment, judges held back theoretical cleavages underlying the judicial dispute over the Charter. Indeed, both courts are in fundamental disagreement. This contribution has argued that the ECJ will pay due regard to national sensitivities, which it will blend into the application of the Charter by granting member states leeway to apply national human rights on the condition that they respect the primacy of Union law. This 'fusion thesis' is not gesture politics, since Luxembourg will give national (constitutional) courts room for country-specific solutions, in particular in areas where Union law is loosely knit, while retaining full control of disputes concerning the validity of EU law. By contrast, the FCC pursues a settlement which is based upon the strict demarcation of respective spheres of influence. This 'separation thesis' reflects, in part at least, specificities of the German court structure and defends, among others, the special status of the FCC vis-à-vis regular courts and the general public. But court interests are not the only force driving the dispute. Arguably, there is more profound disagreement.
In recent years, pluralist accounts have emerged as a lead narrative to account for the loss of unitary legal orders. The dispute analysed in this paper confirms the appeal of pluralist thinking in general, but emphasises different theoretical strands. The FCC's separation thesis corresponds to a group of authors who suggest a deep conflict between legal orders, amongst which interchange is regulated by courts striving for interest-driven utility maximisation as rational actors. By contrast, the ECJ's fusion thesis mirrors accounts which emphasise interconnections between legal orders as the basis for intra-legal solutions to conflicts through procedural and substantive reflexivity; courts are engaged in a communicative dialogue about how to conceive of the foundations of legitimate public authority in an age of jurisdictional overlap. If that is correct, the recent spat is about much more than the reach of the Charter and epitomises divergent visions of how to accommodate national autonomy and European law. Pragmatic approximation may provide the groundwork for conciliation among courts -and yet the fundamental choice between different legal paths to a continent united in diversity remains.
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